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Abstract
Solar Geoengineering (SG) is a set of potential technologies to counteract climate
change. While SG can only imperfectly compensate for temperature changes at the
regional level, studies assessing regional SG impacts indicated so far that regional
temperature disparities from SG may not be as severe as previously thought. A
shortcoming of that literature is its assumption that regions’ temperature prefer-
ences correspond to some historic baseline climate. I extend the main framework for
examining regional SG impacts by allowing for regions to have temperature prefer-
ences diverging from the baseline climate, showing that the impact of these diverging
preferences can be split into two components. The first component changes the opti-
mal SG level, but does not affect regional disagreement over SG. The second compo-
nent leaves the optimal SG level unaffected, but changes regional disagreement over
SG. I identify three aspects of SG performance in the presence of diverging prefer-
ences. A numerical implementation of the extended model shows that the presence
of diverging preferences may change SG performance in either direction and that
the direction generally depends on which of the three aspects of SG performance is
considered.
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1 Introduction
Techniques to increase the earth’s reflection of solar radiation, so-called solar geoengi-
neering (SG), have received increasing attention as potential means to reduce climate
change risks. While SG may well be able to compensate for increased temperatures on
a global level, SG has regionally heterogeneous impacts (Lunt et al. 2008, Robock et
al. 2008, Irvine et al. 2010, Ricke et al. 2010). These heterogeneous impacts are widely
regarded as a source of substantial SG governance problems and as a potential source of
conflict (Robock 2008, Shepherd 2009, Weitzman 2015, Heyen 2016, Pasztor 2017).
Regional differences in SG impacts have been the focus of a number of studies
(Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015, Pfrommer 2018). Gen-
erally, the results indicate that regional temperature disparities from SG may not be
as severe as previously thought. However, this literature employs the assumption that
regional climate preferences derive from a common baseline climate, e.g. 1990 or prein-
dustrial climate conditions. This ’change-is-bad-assumption’ has been criticized (Heyen
et al. 2015) and research has provided empirical evidence that certain temperature lev-
els may generally be more conducive to economic activity than others, irrespective of
historic regional climate conditions. Schlenker and Roberts (2009) provide evidence for
a non-linear, inversely U-shaped, relationship between crop yield and daily tempera-
ture. Graff and Neidell (2014) find a similar relationship between labor supply and daily
temperature. On an aggregate level, empirical evidence points towards a globally gen-
eralizable, inversely U-shaped relationship between overall economic productivity and
regional mean temperature (Burke et al 2015, Newell et al. 2018). Additionally, there
are region-specific reasons why a deviation from regional baseline climate conditions
may be beneficial (Heyen et al. 2015), e.g. that more natural resources in high northern
latitudes may become available as temperatures rise.
The main purpose of the paper is to gain a conceptual understanding of the impact
that regionally diverging temperature preferences have on SG outcomes. To this aim,
I extend the Residual Climate Response (RCR) model developed by Moreno-Cruz et
al. (2012). The RCR model is the main framework for examining SG impacts on the
regional level in the literature. The extension allows for regions to have temperature
preferences diverging from the baseline climate and builds on an illustrative example by
Heyen et al. (2015) which demonstrates that regional temperature disparities may be
substantially higher when regions have diverging temperature preferences. The extended
model calculates the welfare maximizing SG level depending on the diverging temper-
ature preferences that regions have. Regional damages, and therefore regional climate
welfare, are determined by regional residual temperature. Regional residual temperature
is the difference between regional temperature given optimal SG and a region’s desired
temperature level.
The key theoretical insight of the extended model is that the impact of diverging
preferences can be split into two components. The first component changes the opti-
mal SG level, but does not affect the set of residual temperatures. This component
therefore does not change regional disagreement over SG. The second component leaves
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the optimal SG level unaffected, but changes the set of residual temperatures. This
decomposition helps in understanding how specific diverging preferences affect globally
optimal SG and the regional disagreement over SG.
In order to quantify the changes in SG outcomes due to diverging preferences, I
propose four metrics. These metrics cover three different aspects of SG performance. The
first aspect is the relative effectiveness of SG in reducing damages. Relative effectiveness
measures in percent the share of regional damages in the high CO2 climate
1 that optimal
SG can compensate for. There are two potential damage reference levels for measuring
relative effectiveness. The first level is total damages (arising from the combination
of CO2 driven temperature changes and diverging preferences), giving rise to the total
damage reduction metric M1 – the metric considered by Heyen et al. (2015). The
second level is purely CO2 driven damages, giving rise to the CO2 damage reduction
metric M2. While the total damage reduction metric measures how well optimal SG
compensates for damages originating from the difference between regional temperatures
in a high CO2 climate and regionally preferred temperatures, the CO2 damage reduction
metric measures how well optimal SG compensates for damages caused by CO2 induced
temperature changes only. While the two damage reference levels – and the two metrics
– are identical in the absence of diverging preferences, they constitute different ways of
assessing the relative effectiveness of SG in the presence of diverging preferences.
The second aspect is the change of the minimum climate damages, or equivalently,
of the maximum climate welfare that SG can implement. It is captured by comparing
residual damages (the sum of regional damages given optimal SG) for a given diverging
preferences scenario to residual damages in the absence of diverging preferences (the
’baseline scenario’). This second aspect gives rise to the minimum climate damage
metric M3. The third aspect is the change in the gross value of SG relative to the
baseline scenario. It is captured by comparing the maximum reduction of damages that
SG can achieve for a given diverging preferences scenario to the maximum reduction
in the baseline scenario and gives rise to the gross value metric M4. While relative
effectiveness measures SG performance with respect to one fixed diverging preferences
scenario, the other two aspects measure SG performance relative to SG performance in
the baseline scenario. Thereby, they make absolute SG outcomes – in case of M3 the
maximum climate welfare that SG can implement, in case of M4 the gross value of SG
– comparable across different diverging preferences scenarios.
A diverging preferences scenario can be expressed as a combination of a ’profile’ and
of a ’preference strength’. A profile describes regions’ diverging temperatures preferences
relative to each other, the preference strength determines the magnitude of the desired
temperature deviations from the baseline climate. Profiles in which high-latitude regions
generally prefer higher temperatures than in the baseline climate and low-latitude re-
gions generally prefer lower temperatures are of specific interest, since they are plausible
and, at least for aggregate economic performance, are supported by empirical evidence
(Burke et al. 2015, Newell et al. 2018). In order to develop a basic understanding
1In the entire paper, CO2 is intended to mean ”CO2 equivalent”, i.e. CO2 represents all greenhouse
gases.
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of how diverging preferences deriving from such profiles affect SG outcomes, I numer-
ically implement two concrete such profiles with data from the Geoengineering Model
Intercomparision Project (Kravitz et al. 2011). For each profile, I implement different
strengths of diverging preferences in order to capture effects that are non-linear in the
magnitude of the desired temperature deviations from the baseline climate.
The numerical implementation shows that the performance of optimal SG in the
presence of diverging preferences relative to the baseline scenario may change in either
direction and that the direction generally depends on which of the three aspects of SG
performance is considered. The latter implies that the aspects and metrics developed
are in fact independent and convey complementary information about how SG perfor-
mance changes in the presence of diverging preferences. Furthermore, optimal climate
welfare in the presence of diverging preferences generally compares differently relative to
different welfare reference levels. Compared to optimal climate welfare in the baseline
scenario, optimal climate welfare in the presence of diverging preferences is higher when
the magnitude of the desired temperature deviations is small, but smaller for moderate
and large desired temperature deviations. In contrast, compared to climate welfare in
the baseline climate (i.e. in the climate before CO2 driven temperature changes set in),
optimal climate welfare in the presence of diverging preferences is higher for all but very
small magnitudes of desired temperature deviations.
I proceed as follows. In section 2, I introduce the RCR model. Section 3 extends
the RCR model. The implementation of the scenarios follows in section 4. Section 5
concludes.
2 The Residual Climate Response Model
The Residual Climate Response (RCR) model (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012) is a simple
framework for evaluating regional effects of solar geoengineering (SG). The main purpose
of the RCR model is to examine how well SG can compensate for CO2 induced climate
change on the regional level. Due to its simplicity, the model is intuitively accessible
(compare Figure 1). Its strength lies in identifying first-order effects in the assessment
of regional SG impacts and in providing a framework for conceptually thinking about
regional disparities in SG outcomes.
The RCR model operates on a fixed number of regions. In the model, regional cli-
mate damages derive from the difference in mean temperature between actual climate
conditions and climate conditions in some baseline climate. The CO2 vector TCO2 con-
sists of the regional temperature increases due to CO2 emissions relative to the baseline
climate.2 One unit of SG is defined as the amount of SG restoring global mean tempera-
ture to the level of the baseline climate. The SG vector TSG consists of the regional mean
temperature changes due to one unit of SG relative to the high CO2 climate. Since the
CO2 and SG vectors are not congruent (i.e. the relative effects of CO2 and SG on tem-
2While other metrics, like regional precipitation, are generally relevant and employed as well, I focus
on the metric of regional temperature. Baseline climates employed in the literature are preindustrial and
1990 climate conditions (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015, Pfrommer 2018).
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peratures differ across regions), SG can only imperfectly compensate for CO2 induced
temperature increases on a regional level. The model assumes linearity in the effect of
SG on regional temperature.3 The SG level x is defined as a fraction of one unit of
SG. Due to the linearity assumption, the residual vector TRES of regional temperatures,
given the SG level x, is
TRES(x) = TCO2 + x · TSG.
The global welfare measure is residual damages, i.e. the sum of regional damages, and
corresponds to the squared length of the residual vector TRES for a given level of SG:
D(x) =
∑
i
di(x) = |TRES(x)|2 with di(x) = (T iCO2 + x · T iSG)2.
The optimal SG level, minimizing residual damages, is
x∗ = −
∑
i T
i
SG · T iCO2
|TSG|2 = −
TSG • TCO2
|TSG|2 =
|TCO2| · cos(ϕ)
|TSG| ,
where ϕ is the angle between the CO2 and the SG vector and (•) the dot product between
vectors.4 The smaller ϕ, the more similar the CO2 and the SG vector and the better SG
can compensate for the temperature changes on a regional level caused by CO2: In case
the vectors are parallel (ϕ = 0°), compensation is perfect. Consequently, we then have
x∗ = 1 and D(x∗) = 0. In case the vectors are perpendicular (ϕ = 90°), compensation
is not possible at all. Consequently, we then have x∗ = 0 and D(x∗) = |TCO2|2. If not
stated otherwise, the terms residual damages and residual vector from now on refer to
the respective outcomes given the optimal SG level.
The metric M used for assessing SG is the relative effectiveness of optimal SG in
compensating for CO2 induced damages on the regional level.
5 Due to the linearity
assumption, M does not depend on the length of the CO2 vector, but only on ϕ. Since
the dot product between the residual vector TRES(x
∗) and the SG vector TSG is zero,
the two are perpendicular (see Figure 1) and M evaluates to
D(0)−D(x∗)
D(0)
= 1− |TRES(x
∗)|2
|TCO2|2 = 1− sin
2(ϕ).
3Evidence for the reasonableness of this assumption is provided, among others, by Moreno-Cruz et
al. (2012) and Kravitz et al. (2014).
4Technically, ϕ as depicted in Figure 1, is not the angle between the CO2 and the SG vector, but
between the CO2 vector and the negative of the SG vector. ϕ is to be understood as defined by Figure
1. The reason for doing so is that I do not want to deviate from the definition in Moreno-Cruz et al.
(2012). The only implication is that cos(ϕ) picks up a minus sign:
cos(ϕ) = − TCO2 • TSG|TCO2| · |TSG| .
5The damages different regions experience may also be weighted. Such weights may, for example,
reflect differences in population or economic output. However, the analysis does not fundamentally
change in the presence of welfare weights and the possibility of welfare weights is therefore not further
pursued in this paper.
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Figure 1: Two-region representation of the Residual Climate Response model. The horizontal
axis shows changes in temperature for region A, the vertical axis shows changes in temperature for
region B. The blue CO2 vector represents regional temperature changes due to CO2. The green
SG vector represents regional temperature changes due to optimal SG. The red residual vector
points to regional temperatures under optimal SG. Since regional damages are quadratic, the
squared length of the residual vector is proportional to residual damages. The angel ϕ between
CO2 and SG vector represents the extent to which SG can compensate for regional temperature
changes due to CO2 and determines the socially optimal SG level as well as the metric M.
3 Extension of the Residual Climate Response Model
The following extension of the RCR model includes the possibility of diverging regional
preferences from the baseline climate. The vector TDIV of diverging temperature pref-
erences consists of each region’s preferred temperature relative to the baseline climate.
From a societal perspective, the aim in deploying SG in the baseline model is to compen-
sate for the CO2 induced regional temperature deviation from the baseline climate as
represented by the CO2 vector. In the face of diverging preferences, the aim changes to
compensating for the differences between regional temperatures in the high CO2 climate
and regions’ preferred temperature levels. The residual vector in the extended model is
therefore
TRES(x, TDIV) = (TCO2 − TDIV) + x · TSG
and the welfare goal is minimizing
D(x, TDIV) = |TRES(x, TDIV)|2.
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When referring to the residual vector and the residual damages in the absence of diverg-
ing preferences, I will leave out the second argument.
Denote the angle between the SG vector and the diverging preferences vector by ϑ
(see Figure 2). Furthermore, denote optimal SG in the baseline model as x∗ and in
the extended model as x∗DIV. The optimal amount of SG in the presence of diverging
preferences is then
x∗DIV = −
TSG • (TCO2 − TDIV)
|TSG|2 = x
∗ +
|TDIV| · cos(ϑ)
|TSG| .
The vector of diverging preferences can be decomposed into a component parallel and
a component perpendicular to the SG vector. In case ϑ is larger than 90°, the parallel
component points in the opposite direction of the SG vector. The diverging preferences
vector then (partially) substitutes for the cooling the SG vector provides and less SG
is optimal than in the absence of diverging preferences. The contrary is true in case
ϑ is smaller than 90° and the parallel component points in the same direction as the
SG vector. The decomposition of the diverging preferences vector into the parallel and
perpendicular components is
TDIV = T
⊥
DIV + TDIV,
with TDIV =
TSG • TDIV
|TSG|2 · TSG and T
⊥
DIV = TDIV − TDIV.
The component parallel to the SG vector changes regional temperature preferences in
the same proportions as SG changes regional temperatures. Increasing or decreasing
SG relative to optimal SG in the baseline model can therefore perfectly compensate for
the parallel component. This implies that the parallel component does not change the
residual vector. Therefore, optimal SG changes, but regional damages and hence residual
damages do not change relative to the absence of diverging preferences. In particular,
when the diverging preferences vector is (anti)parallel to the SG vector, regions disagree
about SG in exact the same way as in the baseline model.
In contrast, changing the SG level cannot compensate for the perpendicular compo-
nent at all and the perpendicular component does therefore not affect optimal SG. It
must then completely be taken up by the residual vector, thereby changing how regions
disagree about SG relative to the baseline model. In particular, when the diverging pref-
erences vector is perpendicular to the SG vector, optimal SG does not change compared
to the baseline model.
The residual vector in the presence of diverging preferences may be longer or shorter
than the residual vector in the baseline model – reflecting an increase or decrease in
residual damages – depending on its perpendicular component’s length and direction
relative to the baseline residual vector. The angle between the perpendicular component
and the baseline residual vector is from now on denoted by γ. The tighter γ and the
shorter the perpendicular component relative to the baseline residual vector, the more
likely it is that residual damages are smaller in the presence of diverging preferences.
When γ is smaller than 90°, the vectors largely point into the same direction and partially
cancel out. When γ is larger than 90°, both vectors point in opposing directions and the
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Figure 2: Extension of the Residual Climate Response model. The combination of the solid
green vector and the dashed green vector represents regional temperature changes due to optimal
SG in the baseline model, the dashed red vector represents the regional residual temperatures
in the baseline model. The solid green vector represents regional temperature changes due
to optimal SG in the presence of the purple diverging preferences vector. The latter can be
decomposed into a component parallel and a component perpendicular to the SG vector. The
parallel component changes the optimal SG level. The perpendicular component changes the
residual vector. Since the angle ϑ between the diverging preferences vector and the SG vector is
larger than 90°, optimal SG decreases relative to the baseline model. The residual vector in the
presence of diverging preferences is the red baseline residual vector less the purple perpendicular
component. Since the perpendicular component points into the opposite direction of the baseline
residual vector, the residual vector in the presence of diverging preferences is longer than the
baseline residual vector, i.e. residual damages increase.
perpendicular component necessarily increases residual damages. In Figure 2, we have
γ = 180°, hence residual damages in the example depicted are larger in the presence of
diverging preferences. When the perpendicular component is at least twice at large as
the baseline residual vector, the perpendicular component necessarily overcompensates
for the baseline residual vector and residual damages increase even if the vectors are
parallel (γ = 0°).
Theoretical Result. Let TDIV = T
⊥
DIV + TDIV be the vector of diverging preferences
and its decomposition into the perpendicular and the parallel component.
1. The optimal SG level is
x∗DIV = x
∗ +
|TDIV| · cos(ϑ)
|TSG| = x
∗ +
|TDIV|
|TSG| · sign(cos(ϑ)).
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2. The residual vector is
TRES(x
∗
DIV, TDIV) = TRES(x
∗)− T⊥DIV
3. Residual damages in presence of diverging preferences are smaller than those in
absence of diverging preferences if and only if
cos(γ) >
1
2
|T⊥DIV|
|TRES(x∗)| ,
where γ is the angle between the perpendicular component T⊥DIV and the residual
vector TRES(x
∗) in the baseline model.
Assessment Metrics
In the baseline RCR model, the performance of optimal SG is captured by a single
aspect, the relative effectiveness in damage compensation. In contrast, at least three
different aspects of SG performance are of interest in relation to diverging preferences.
Analogously to the baseline model, the first aspect is the relative effectiveness of optimal
SG in reducing damages for a given diverging preferences scenario. Measuring relative
effectiveness necessarily involves the definition of a damage reference level. In the base-
line model, the obvious choice for that reference level is damages in absence of SG or,
equivalently, damages caused by CO2. However, damages in absence of SG and dam-
ages caused by CO2 are different damage levels in the presence of diverging preferences.
These two reference levels for measuring relative effectiveness give rise to two different
metrics in the extended model. The first is the total damage reduction metric M1, using
total damages (arising from the combination of CO2 induced temperature changes and
diverging preferences) as damage reference level. The total damage reduction metric is
the one used by Heyen et al. (2015) for illustrating the potential impact of diverging
preferences on SG performance. The second one is the CO2 damage reduction metric
M2, using damages purely caused by CO2 induced temperature changes (i.e. total dam-
ages less damages from the mere presence of diverging preferences) as damage reference
level. The total damage reduction metric measures how well optimal SG compensates
for damages arising from the differences between regional temperatures in the high CO2
climate and regionally preferred temperatures. Since the total damage reduction metric
measures SG effectiveness relative to the regional optima, its maximum value is 100%.
The CO2 damage reduction metric measures how well optimal SG compensates for dam-
ages arising from differences between regional temperatures in the high CO2 climate and
regional temperatures in the baseline climate. The relative effectiveness in compensat-
ing for damages purely caused by CO2 induced temperature changes can therefore be
higher than 100%. In those cases, optimal SG compensates for more damages than CO2
causes, meaning that residual damages are lower than damages in the baseline climate.
Analytical definitions of the metrics can be found in Table 1.
At least two different aspects of SG performance concerning the change in perfor-
mance across different diverging preferences scenarios are of interest. The first aspect
8
is the minimum climate damages, or, equivalently, the maximum climate welfare that
SG can implement. This aspect is captured by residual damages, i.e. damages given
optimal SG. In order to compare SG performance across different diverging preferences
scenarios, residual damages are normalized for a given diverging preferences scenario
to baseline residual damages. This aspect gives rise to the minimum climate damage
metric M3, measuring how maximum climate welfare changes with the presence of di-
verging preferences. The second aspect is the gross value of SG, which is captured by
the maximum damage reduction SG can achieve. For comparing the gross value across
different diverging preferences scenarios, they are normalized to the gross value of SG in
the baseline model. This aspect gives rise to the gross value metric M4, which measures
how the gross value of SG changes with the presence of diverging preferences. Note
that in the baseline model, or for any other fixed preferences scenario, maximum climate
welfare and the gross value of SG are redundant. However, they are independent across
climate preferences, since total damages vary across different climate preferences.
Metrics in the Presence of Diverging Preferences
M1 M2 M3 M4
∆D(TDIV)
D(0, TDIV)
∆D(TDIV)
D(0, TDIV)− |TDIV|2
D(x∗DIV, TDIV)
D(x∗)
∆D(TDIV)
D(0)−D(x∗)
Table 1: ∆D(TDIV) expresses the difference in damages between no SG and optimal SG for a
given vector of diverging preferences: ∆D(TDIV) = D(0, TDIV) − D(x∗DIV, TDIV). The metrics
are the total damage reduction metric M1, the CO2 damage reduction metric M2, the minimum
climate damage metric M3 and the gross value metric M4.
The metric in the baseline model is determined by ϕ, whereas the metrics in the
extended model additionally depend on ϑ and the relative length of the diverging pref-
erences vector and the CO2 vector.
4 Exemplary Implementation of Preferences Scenarios
The exemplary implementation of the extended RCR model delivers a closer examination
of how a specific class of diverging preferences scenarios affects SG outcomes. I follow
the relevant literature (Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Kravitz et al. 2014, Yu et al. 2015,
Pfrommer 2018) in defining the regions of the RCR model according to Giorgi and
Francisco (2000). I use data from the thirteen climate models which participated in
the G1 experiment as defined in the Geoengineering Model Intercomparision Project
(Kravitz et al. 2011) for the implementation. Each model performed a run simulating
preindustrial climate conditions, a run simulating a climate with four times elevated
CO2 concentration levels, and a run in which SG is used to restore the global mean
temperature to the preindustrial level. The regional mean temperatures, averaged over
the thirteen models, of the three runs are used to calculate the CO2 vector and the SG
vector.
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The SG literature usually normalizes regional temperatures to each region’s preindus-
trial interannual variability when assessing SG (Heyen et al. 2015). However, potential
sources for diverging regional preferences derive from phenomena related to absolute
temperatures (Burke et al. 2015, Heyen et al. 2015, Newell et al. 2018). Therefore,
I use absolute temperatures for the implementation. For comparison, I provide the re-
sults when using normalized temperatures in the appendix. The results I obtain for the
baseline RCR model when using normalized temperatures are in line with the literature
(Moreno-Cruz et al. 2012, Yu et al. 2015). The main difference in results between
using normalized and absolute temperatures in the presence of diverging preferences is
that optimal SG levels are substantially higher when using normalized temperatures.
The difference is explained by low-latitude regions having on average a much smaller
interannual variability in mean temperature than high-latitude regions. The upshot is
that absolute temperatures should be used for the extended RCR model, unless one
has evidence that the impacts one is interested in are better captured by normalized
temperatures.
The Scenarios
I focus on scenarios which are based on the premise that, as a rule, high-latitude regions
prefer a warmer climate and low-latitude regions prefer a cooler climate relative to the
baseline climate. This general scenario structure is both plausible and supported by
empirical evidence (Burke et al. 2015, Newell et al. 2018). I group regions into high-
latitude, high-mid-latitude, low-mid-latitude and low-latitude bins (see Table 2).
I consider two scenario profiles. In scenario profile A, regions pertaining to the high-
latitude group desire a warmer climate than in the baseline climate and regions in the
low-latitude group desire a colder one. All mid-latitude regions are content with the
baseline climate. The difference in scenario profile B is that regions in the high-mid-
latitude group also desire a warmer climate. Implementing two scenario profiles reduces
the risk of picking up results which are idiosyncratic to a specific profile and essentially
serves as a robustness check. Regions’ diverging preferences in the scenario profiles are
always equally strong or not present: Each region’s desired temperature is one unit
above temperatures in the regional baseline climate, one unit below temperatures in the
regional baseline climate or equals temperatures in the regional baseline climate.
The last part of the theoretical result implies non-linear effects in the relative length
of the diverging preference vector on the change in SG outcomes. In order to capture
these effects, I consider different strengths of diverging preferences (i.e. different sizes
of what constitutes ”one unit”) for each scenario profile. In other words, a scenario
profile defines regions’ diverging preferences relative to each other (the direction of the
diverging preference vector) and the preference strength defines the magnitude of the
desired temperature deviations from the baseline climate (the vector’s relative length).
Jointly, the two determine a diverging preferences scenario. I define preference strength
in percent of the average regional temperature change caused by CO2. Due to the RCR
model’s linearity, this relative definition leads to well-defined results. As an example, say
CO2 driven average regional warming is 4°C. A strength of 50% in diverging preferences
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Grouping of Regions and Scenario Profiles
Each Region’s Scenario Profile
Avg. Lat. Opt. SG Level Res. Temp. A B
Greenland 67.5N 1.09 0.44 1.0 1.0
Alaska 66.0N 1.08 0.50 1.0 1.0
North. Europe 61.5N 1.09 0.33 1.0 1.0
North Asia 60.0N 1.12 0.66 1.0 1.0
WN America 45.0N 1.04 0.06 0.0 1.0
CN America 40.0N 1.07 0.23 0.0 1.0
Central Asia 40.0N 1.02 -0.08 0.0 1.0
Tibet 40.0N 0.99 -0.29 0.0 1.0
Mediterranean 39.0N 1.04 0.05 0.0 0.0
SS America 38.0S 1.02 -0.04 0.0 0.0
EN America 37.5N 1.03 0.01 0.0 0.0
South. Australia 37.5S 1.01 -0.09 0.0 0.0
East Asia 35.0N 1.03 0.02 0.0 0.0
Sahara 24.0N 0.99 -0.21 -1.0 -1.0
Central America 20.0N 0.97 -0.29 -1.0 -1.0
South Asia 17.5N 0.96 -0.35 -1.0 -1.0
Southern Africa 11.5S 0.97 -0.27 -1.0 -1.0
North. Australia 9.5S 0.95 -0.38 -1.0 -1.0
Southeast Asia 4.5N 0.93 -0.35 -1.0 -1.0
Amazon Basin 4.0S 0.99 -0.20 -1.0 -1.0
Western Africa 3.0N 0.97 -0.31 -1.0 -1.0
Eastern Africa 3.0N 0.97 -0.30 -1.0 -1.0
Table 2: Regions are ordered according to their average latitude and grouped into ’high-
latitude’, ’high-mid-latitude’, ’low-mid-latitude’ and ’low-latitude’ bins. The left columns states
each region’s average latitude, each region’s preferred SG level and each region’s residual tem-
perature under optimal SG. The right columns states the scenario profiles A and B.
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then means that regions desiring a temperature change relative to the regional baseline
climate do so by 2°C.
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Figure 3: Two-region representation of the basic structure underlying the scenarios. Given
baseline climate preferences, optimal SG undercompensates for temperature in the high-latitude
region, but overcompensates for temperature in the low-latitude region. The high-latitude region
desires a warmer climate and the low-latitude region a colder climate compared to the baseline
climate. In this specific example, the SG vector and the diverging preferences vector are per-
pendicular (ϑ = 90°), hence the optimal SG level does not change relative to the baseline model.
Due to the structure of the scenario, the perpendicular component of the diverging preferences
vector (note that there is no parallel component in this specific example) and the baseline resid-
ual vector (which here is the combination of the violet diverging preferences vector and the red
residual vector in the presence of diverging preferences) point into the same direction. The angle
γ between the two vectors is 0°, since they are parallel, and the former compensates in part for
the latter. In a two-region example, γ can only attain 0°and 180°, which is not the case when a
higher number of regions is involved.
The theoretical result mirrors the result from the two-region example (Figure 3).
It states that, for residual damages to decrease due to diverging preferences, the angle
γ between the perpendicular component of the diverging preferences vector and the
baseline residual vector has to be between −90° and 90°, while at the same time the
former vector has to be short enough relative to the latter. Taking into account that
in the two-region example γ is 0°, the theoretical result exactly predicts the outcomes
in two-region example. The theoretical result tells us that the pattern will qualitatively
hold beyond two-region examples if only γ is between −90° and 90°. It is self-evident
that for two-region examples γ is always in that range (even exactly 0°). Whether this
is the case in a specific multi-region scenario ultimately depends on the details of the
scenario profile, such as which regions are considered high-latitude, which are considered
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low-latitude, how strong individual regions’ preferences are and the differential impacts
of SG along other dimensions than latitude. However, for the type of scenario profile
under consideration, it seems likely that γ is in that range – at least for many scenario
profiles. The implementation delivers the actual γ for two specific scenario profiles and
delivers the range of preference strengths for which residual damages are smaller than
in the baseline scenario, i.e. for which the minimum climate damage metric evaluates to
below 100%. Lastly, the implementation may reveal whether there are similar patterns
concerning other aspects of SG performance.
Results of the Implementation
I report the angles ϕ, ϑ and γ and the optimal SG level in absence and presence of
diverging preferences. I report the results for the four metrics for several preference
strengths between 0% and 100%. The angle ϕ and optimal SG in absence of diverging
preferences x∗ are independent of the scenario profile. Given x∗, ϑ (which is determined
by the scenario profile) and the strength of diverging preferences jointly determine the
SG level in presence of diverging preferences. Optimal SG is linear in the preference
strength and it suffices to only explicitly report optimal SG for one particular strength.
The optimal SG level x∗DIV reported refers to a preference strength of 100%.
6
Optimal SG Levels and Angles between Vectors
Baseline Model Scenario Profile A Scenario Profile B
x∗ ϕ M x∗DIV ϑ γ x
∗
DIV ϑ γ
1.03 2.9° 99.7 1.16 80.1° 22.6° 0.96 94.5° 38.2°
Table 3: The left columns state the optimal SG level x∗ in the baseline model, the angle ϕ
between the CO2 and the SG vector and the metric M (in percent) from the baseline model.
The middle columns and the right columns state, for the scenario profiles A and B, respectively,
the optimal SG level x∗DIV when preference strength is 100%, the angle ϑ between the SG vector
and the diverging preferences vector and the angle γ between the perpendicular component of
the diverging preferences vector and the baseline residual vector.
The angle ϕ between the CO2 vector and the SG vector is small (2.9°). In the
absence of diverging preferences, optimal SG is therefore close to one and the relative
effectiveness of SG in reducing CO2 induced damages (metric M ) is close to 100%. For
both scenario profiles, the angle ϑ between the SG vector and the diverging preferences
vector is close to 90° (scenario profile A: ϑ = 80.1°, scenario profile B: ϑ = 94.5°).
Consequently, optimal SG differs only moderately between the absence and presence of
diverging preferences. Even for very strong diverging preferences (100%), optimal SG is
only 0.13 higher than in the baseline model (+12.6%) for scenario profile A and only 0.07
lower than in the baseline model (−6.8%) in scenario profile B. Optimal SG is larger
6Optimal SG for other preference strengths can be obtained by linear interpolation. For example,
optimal SG for a strength of 50% is x∗ + 0.5 · (x∗DIV − x∗).
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in scenario profile A than in scenario profile B, corresponding to the on net stronger
preferences for higher temperatures in scenario profile B.
The total damage reduction metric M1 and the minimum climate damage metric
M3 exhibit a similar pattern for both scenario profiles. According to both metrics,
the performance of optimal SG increases for weak diverging preferences relative to the
baseline scenario and then decreases again for strong diverging preferences. Minimum
residual damages are attained for a preference strength of 6.4% in scenario profile A and
for a preference strength of 4.7% in scenario profile B. Residual damages start to exceed
baseline residual damages for a preference strength of 12.8% in scenario profile A and for
9.4% in scenario profile B. The corresponding preferences strengths for the total damage
reduction metric are very similar (differences < 0.2%). Residual damages become very
large relative to baseline residual damages for very strong diverging preferences, up
to a factor of 184 and of 255 higher in scenario profile A and B, respectively. Relative
effectiveness in compensating for total damages is substantially lower than in the baseline
scenario for very strong diverging preferences, down to 72.9% and 56.9% in scenario
profile A and B, respectively. However, for both scenario profiles, SG can compensate
for at least 86.1% of total damages when the preference strength is no higher than 50%
and for at least 96.9% when the preference strength is no higher than 25%.
Results for the Four Metrics
Preference Scenario Profile A Scenario Profile B
Strength M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4
0% 99.7 99.7 100.0 100.0 99.7 99.7 100.0 100.0
5% 99.9 100.0 18.7 101.2 99.9 100.0 38.5 99.3
10% 99.8 100.4 42.3 102.5 99.7 100.4 117.3 98.6
15% 99.5 100.7 170.7 103.8 99.1 100.8 336.5 98.0
25% 98.2 101.4 742.1 106.5 96.9 101.5 1196 96.6
50% 91.6 103.2 4005 113.1 86.1 103.6 5801 93.3
75% 82.4 105.1 9890 120.0 71.5 106.0 13915 90.1
100% 72.8 106.9 18396 127.1 56.9 108.7 25539 86.9
Table 4: The metrics are the total damage reduction metric M1, the CO2 damage reduction
metric M2, the minimum climate damage metric M3 and the gross value metric M4. M1 and
M2 are in percent of their respective reference damage level. M3 and M4 are in percent relative
to the respective outcome in the baseline scenario. Results are given in incremental steps in the
strength of diverging preferences. For example, a strength of 50% means that one unit of diverging
preferences corresponds to half the average regional temperature change from climate change.
If regional mean temperature rises by 4°C in absence of SG, a strength of 50% corresponds to
low-latitude regions having a diverging temperature preference of −2°C and high-latitude regions
having a diverging temperature preference of +2°C in scenario profile A.
The changes in the CO2 damage reduction metric M2 and the gross value metric M4
are monotone in the strength of diverging preferences. The relationship between the two
metrics and preference strength is almost linear. Relative effectiveness in compensating
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for damages caused by CO2 increases in both scenarios. For very strong diverging
preferences, it is 106.9% in scenario A and 108.7% in scenario B. Relative effectiveness
in compensating for damages caused by CO2 is at least 100% in both scenarios when
the strength of diverging preferences is at least 5%. The gross value of SG increases
in scenario A, but decreases in scenario B. For very strong diverging preferences, the
gross value of SG is 27.1% higher than the gross value of SG in absence of diverging
preferences in the former and 13.1% lower than the gross value of SG in absence of
diverging preferences in the latter.
Explanation and Interpretation of the Results
The minimum climate damage metric M3 measures the maximum climate welfare SG
can implement in a scenario relative to maximum climate welfare in the baseline scenario
and is determined by the ratio of the respective residual damages. Since γ = 22.6° in
scenario profile A and γ = 38.2° in scenario profile B, the minimum climate damage
metric follows the pattern presumed in advance: The metric is smaller than 100% for
weak diverging preferences and larger than 100% for moderate to strong diverging pref-
erences in both scenario profiles. In both scenario profiles, γ is well within the range of
(−90°, 90°). One can therefore expect γ to be generally within this range for scenario
profiles following the basic premise, implying that one can expect the pattern to gen-
erally hold for such scenario profiles. The values cos(γ) attains in the scenario profiles
are close to one (0.92 in scenario profile A, 0.78 in scenario profile B). The preference
strengths for which the minimum climate damage metric is smaller than 100% in sce-
nario profile A are therefore close to the maximum of such strengths possible for any
scenario profile. For strong diverging preferences, the perpendicular component of the
diverging preferences vector is, irrespective of its direction, much larger than the base-
line residual vector. The residual vector is then almost identical to the perpendicular
component. Hence, the minimum climate damage metric becomes very large for strong
diverging preferences, irrespective of the scenario profile.
The total damage reduction metric M1 measures the relative effectiveness of optimal
SG in compensating for total damages. It can be expressed as
1− |TRES(x
∗)− T⊥DIV|2
|TCO2 − TDIV|2 .
In both scenario profiles, the relative effectiveness in compensating for total damages
is higher than in the baseline scenario for weak diverging preferences and lower for
moderate to strong ones. Since the CO2 vector is comparatively large, the relative
change in total damages (the denominator in the expression) from absence to presence
of diverging preferences is comparatively small, while the relative change in residual
damages (the nominator in the expression) is comparatively high. Therefore, residual
damages govern the qualitative behavior of the total damage reduction metric at least for
weak and moderate preferences, resulting in the observed pattern in both scenarios. This
intuition is valid except for the rather unrealistic case of the perpendicular component
being trivial.
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The CO2 damage reduction metric M2 measures the relative effectiveness of optimal
SG in compensating for damages caused by CO2. It can be expressed as
1 +
|TDIV|2 − |TRES(x∗DIV, TDIV)|2
|TCO2 − TDIV|2 − |TDIV|2 .
From this characterization, it is evident that the CO2 damage reduction metric evalu-
ates to 100% when the diverging preferences vector and the residual vector are of the
same length, i.e. when SG restores the damage level of the baseline climate, thereby ex-
actly compensating for pure CO2 damages.
7 In both scenario profiles, the CO2 damage
reduction metric exceeds 100% for even weak preferences. When γ ∈ (−90°, 90°), the
residual vector becomes shorter for weak preferences. The closer γ is to 0°, the faster
the diverging preference vector becomes longer than the residual vector with increasing
preference strength.8 Since the baseline residual vector is very short and γ is in both
scenarios of small to moderate size, the CO2 damage reduction metric becomes larger
than 100% for even weak preferences in both scenario profiles.
The gross value metric M4 measures the gross value of SG in a scenario relative to
its gross value in the baseline scenario. It can be expressed as
|TCO2 − TDIV|2 − |TRES(x∗)− T⊥DIV|2
|TCO2|2 − |TRES(x∗)|2 .
The gross value metric exceeds 100% for all preference strengths in scenario A and
is below 100% for all preference strengths in scenario B, coinciding with optimal SG
increasing in scenario profile A and decreasing in scenario profile B relative to optimal
SG in the baseline scenario. As a heuristic, the parallel component of the diverging
preferences vector and the CO2 vector can be considered as (anti)parallel, since the
angle ϕ between the SG and the CO2 vector is very small. Intuitively, the parallel
component then increases total damages when it causes optimal SG to rise and reduces
total damages when it causes optimal SG to fall, while not affecting the residual vector
– in other words, the parallel component increases the gross value of SG when it causes
optimal SG to rise and decreases the gross value of SG when it causes optimal SG to
fall. However, this reasoning leaves out the influence of the perpendicular component on
the change in gross value of SG. This means that, while a positive change in optimal SG
increases the gross value of SG ceteris paribus, a positive (negative) change in optimal
SG relative to optimal SG in the baseline scenario does not necessarily correspond to a
gross value of SG higher (lower) than in the baseline scenario.
The numerical implementation and its discussion yield two main results. Firstly,
the performance of optimal SG in presence of diverging preferences may increase or
7Note that the distribution of damages among regions will then be different than in the baseline
climate.
8It can be easily be shown that the diverging preference vector always becomes longer than the
residual vector for strong enough preferences when γ ∈ (−90°, 90°): It holds that
|TDIV|2 − |TRES(x∗DIV, TDIV)|2 = |TDIV|2 − |TRES(x∗)|2 + TRES(x∗) • T⊥DIV.
The last term on the right-hand side is positive if γ ∈ (−90°, 90°), from which the statement follows.
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decrease relative to its performance in absence of diverging preferences. Which one is
the case depends on the diverging preferences scenario, the aspect of SG performance
one is interested in and, for the aspect of relative effectiveness of optimal SG, on the
damage reference level against which relative effectiveness is measured. This underpins
the importance of specifying the aspect of SG performance and, if applicable, the damage
reference level, when assessing SG in presence of diverging preferences. Specifically, the
absolute damage reduction metric and the minimum climate damage metric are different
ways of measuring how well SG can minimize residual damages – in the former case for a
specific diverging preferences scenario relative to total damages, in the later case relative
to residual damages in the absence of diverging preferences. Both indicate a reduction
in SG performance in both scenario profiles for diverging preferences which are at least
moderately strong. In contrast, the CO2 damage reduction metric measures how well SG
can bring back damages to pre-climate change levels. This metric indicates an increase
in SG performance in the presence of diverging preferences for both scenario profiles.
The gross value metric measures by how much SG can reduce damages, indicating that
the change in its ability to do so in the presence of diverging preferences is linked to the
change in optimal SG.
Secondly, optimal climate welfare in the presence of diverging preferences generally
compares differently relative to different welfare reference levels. Optimal climate welfare
in the presence of diverging preferences is for both scenario profiles lower compared to
optimal climate welfare in the baseline scenario, when the magnitude of the desired
temperature deviations is at least moderate, but higher for small desired temperature
deviations. In contrast, optimal climate welfare in the presence of diverging preferences
is for both scenario profiles higher compared to climate welfare in the baseline climate
(i.e. in the climate before CO2 driven temperature changes set in) for all but very
small magnitudes of desired temperature deviations. I have argued that these welfare
comparisons are very likely (in case of the minimum climate damage metric even sure)
to persist when the angle γ is small. Since γ can be expected to be small in scenario
profiles in which high-latitude regions prefer a colder climate and low-latitude regions
prefer a warmer one, these welfare comparisons can be expected to hold in scenarios
based on such profiles more generally. These results demonstrate that the assessment of
how diverging climate preferences affect optimal climate welfare very likely depends on
which welfare reference levels one chooses to employ.
5 Conclusion
Solar geoengineering (SG) has the potential to compensate for increased temperatures
from climate change on a global level. However, SG has heterogeneous impacts at the
regional level. Until now, studies examining these regional differences have employed
the assumption that regions’ temperature preferences correspond to a common baseline
climate, e.g. to preindustrial or 1990 climate conditions. This assumption has been
criticized (Heyen et al. 2015) and conflicts with empirical evidence supporting globally
generalizable relationships between economic productivity and absolute temperature lev-
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els (Burke et al. 2015, Newell et al. 2018).
In this paper, I extended the Residual Climate Response (RCR) model (Moreno-Cruz
et al. 2012) for assessing regional SG differences by formally introducing the possibility
of regional temperature preferences diverging from the baseline climate, building on an
illustrative example by Heyen et al. (2015). In the key theoretical result, I showed that
the impact of these diverging preferences can be split into two components. The first
component changes the optimal SG level, but does neither change optimal climate wel-
fare nor affect regional disagreement over SG. The second component leaves the optimal
SG level unaffected, but changes regional disagreement over SG and optimal climate
welfare. This decomposition helps in understanding how specific diverging preferences
affect globally optimal SG and the disagreement over SG by different regions. I intro-
duced metrics for measuring three independent aspects of SG performance. The first
aspect is the relative effectiveness of SG in reducing damages, the second aspect is the
change of optimal climate welfare relative to the absence of diverging preferences and the
third aspect is the change in the gross value of SG relative to the absence of diverging
preferences.
I numerically implemented the extended RCR model, focusing on scenarios in which
high-latitude regions prefer a warmer climate and low-latitude regions prefer a cooler
climate relative to the baseline climate – a scenario structure which is both plausible
and supported by empirical evidence on aggregate economic output (Burke et al. 2015,
Newell et al. 2018). The numerical implementation yields that the performance of opti-
mal SG relative to the baseline scenario can change in either direction in the presence of
diverging preferences and the change generally depends on the aspect of SG performance
one is interested in. The results demonstrate that diverging climate preferences are not
necessarily detrimental to central aspects of SG performance, at least when optimal SG
can be implemented. However, one can expect optimal climate welfare to be lower in
the presence of diverging temperature preferences of substantial magnitudes than in the
absence of diverging preferences.
One should keep in mind that both the baseline and the extended RCR model are
deliberatively simple in nature. They derive their usefulness from conceptual under-
standing and from identifying first-order effects. Additionally, the results I obtained
for the type of scenario I considered are temperature specific and do not necessarily
hold for other climate variables, for which diverging preferences may be relevant as well,
like precipitation. Several lines of research should be pursued in the future for further
increasing the understanding of the relationship between diverging climate preferences
and the assessment of SG. Firstly, I concentrated on the outcomes for globally optimal
SG. Examining the potential impact on Pareto optimal SG levels and on SG levels in
the free-driver outcome (Weitzman 2015), as well as examining the respective welfare
implications, will lead to a more complete picture regarding the relationship between
diverging climate preferences and the assessment of SG. Secondly, investigating the po-
tential impact of diverging preferences on coalition formation (Ricke et al. 2013), in
particular coalitions based on similar latitudes, may lead to further insights into the
strategic dimensions of SG. Lastly, a further conceptual extension seems desirable: Re-
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gional damages may be conceptualized as being a combination of damages deriving from
the variability-adjusted temperature difference to regional baseline climate temperatures
and damages deriving from the absolute temperature difference to some absolute tem-
perature preference. A generalization incorporating both, however, necessarily opens up
the question of the relative weight of both types of damages.
Appendix
A Implementation of the Extended RCRModel Using Nor-
malized Temperatures
In this appendix, I provide the results for the extended RCR model when using tem-
peratures normalized to regional interannual variability. The main difference in results
between using normalized and absolute temperatures in the presence of diverging pref-
erences is that optimal SG levels are substantially higher when using normalized tem-
peratures (compare Table 3 and Table 5). The differences in optimal SG between using
normalized and absolute temperatures is explained by low-latitude regions having on
average a much smaller interannual variability in mean temperature than high-latitude
regions. Using normalized temperatures, diverging temperature preferences of the same
absolute magnitude then translate into a much larger magnitudes in units of interannual
variability for low-latitude regions than for high-latitude regions, while this effect is not
present when using absolute temperatures.
Optimal SG Levels and Angles between Vectors
Baseline Model Scenario A Scenario B
x∗ ϕ M x∗DIV ϑ γ x
∗
DIV ϑ γ
0.99 2.5° 99.8 1.68 59.1° 23.2° 1.60 72.3° 32.7°
Table 5: Results for the implementation of the extended RCR Model using normalized temper-
atures. Corresponds to Table 3. The left columns state the optimal SG level x∗ in the baseline
model, the angle ϕ between the CO2 and the SG vector and the metric M (in percent) from
the baseline model. The middle columns and the right columns state for the scenarios A and B,
respectively, the optimal SG level x∗DIV when preference strength is 100%, the angle ϑ between
the SG vector and the diverging preferences vector and the angle γ between the perpendicular
component of the diverging preferences vector and the baseline residual vector.
The results for the four metrics when using normalized temperatures (compare Table
6) are qualitatively the same as when using absolute temperatures. The same general
patterns can be observed when using normalized temperatures as when using absolute
temperatures, regarding the inversely U-shaped relationship between SG performance
as measured by metric M1, as well as metric M3 and preference strength, regarding M2
exceeding 100% for all but very weak diverging preferences and regarding the relationship
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between the change in optimal SG and metric M4.
Results for the Four Metrics
Preference Scenario A Scenario B
Strength M1 M2 M3 M4 M1 M2 M3 M4
0% 99.8 99.8 100.0 100.0 99.8 99.8 100.0 100.0
5% 99.9 100.1 17.3 107.1 99.9 100.1 30.0 106.2
10% 99.9 100.7 58.4 114.5 99.7 100.6 134.7 112.7
15% 99.6 101.4 223.4 122.1 99.3 101.3 414.3 119.3
25% 98.7 103.1 924.9 138.0 97.9 102.7 1497 133.1
50% 95.3 108.7 4845 182.0 92.7 107.6 7265 170.8
75% 91.4 115.5 11863 232.2 86.9 113.4 17403 213.3
100% 87.7 122.9 21976 288.5 81.6 119.9 31911 260.5
Table 6: Results for the implementation of the extended RCR Model using normalized tem-
peratures. Corresponds to Table 4. The metrics are the total damage reduction metric M1, the
CO2 damage reduction metric M2, the minimum climate damage metric M3 and the gross value
metric M4. M1 and M2 are in percent of their respective damage baseline. M3 and M4 are in
percent relative to the respective outcome in the baseline scenario. Results are given in incre-
mental steps in the strength of diverging preferences. For example, a strength of 50% means that
one unit of diverging preferences corresponds to half the average regional temperature change
from climate change. If regional mean temperature rises by 4°C in absence of SG, a strength of
50% corresponds to low-latitude regions having a diverging temperature preference of −2°C and
high-latitude regions having a diverging temperature preference of +2°C in scenario A.
B Proofs
Proof of the Theoretical Result.
1. Since the residual damages are convex in the SG level, the first equation from the
first part follows from computing the first order conditions of the residual damages
with respect to the SG level. The second equation follows because TDIV is the
projection of TDIV onto TSG.
2. Plugging in the optimal SG level into
TRES(x, TDIV) = (TCO2 − TDIV) + x · TSG
yields
TRES(x
∗
DIV, TDIV) = (TCO2 − (T⊥DIV + TDIV)) + (x∗ +
|TDIV| · cos(ϑ)
|TSG| ) · TSG
= (TCO2 + x
∗ · TSG)− T⊥DIV − TDIV +
|TDIV| · cos(ϑ)
|TSG| · TSG
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Because of
cos(ϑ) =
TSG • TDIV
|TSG| · |TDIV| ,
it holds that
TDIV =
|TDIV| · cos(ϑ)
|TSG| · TSG
and the second part follows.
3. The third part follows from
|TRES(x∗)− T⊥DIV|2 < |TRES(x∗)|2 ⇔
|TRES(x∗)|2 − 2 · TRES(x∗) • T⊥DIV + |TRES(x∗)|2 < |TRES(x∗)|2 ⇔
1
2 · |T⊥DIV|2 < TRES(x∗) • T⊥DIV = |TRES(x∗)| · |T⊥DIV| · cos(γ).
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